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The Value and Limits of Rights: a Reply 
 
Peter Jones* 
 
School of Geography, Politics & Sociology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon 
Tyne, NE1 7RU, UK. 
 
I reply to each of the contributions in this issue.  I agree with much that 
Steiner argues, especially his insistence that the associated ideas of 
impartiality and discontinuity are crucial to dealing satisfactorily with a 
diversity of competing claims.  I am, however, less willing to conceive 
provision for that diversity as the role, rather than a role, that we should 
ascribe to rights.  I question the success of David Miller’s endeavour to 
provide a unified justification of human rights grounded in the concept of 
need. It is the notion of a minimally decent human life, rather than need itself, 
that does most of the justificatory work in Miller’s argument and, arguably, 
that notion does not deliver a genuinely unitary account of human rights.  I 
concede the case for state funding of opera and the arts more generally to 
Horton’s argument, but defend neutralism, and its associated distinction 
between the right and the good, as a strategy for dealing with diversity, 
including cultural diversity.  I resist Bellamy’s attempt to ground all basic 
rights in democracy and suggest that his argument relies upon idealised 
assumptions about the functioning of democracy.  I share much of his 
objection to substituting judicial for political decision-making but argue that a 
strong moral commitment to rights need not imply a shift in power from 
democratic processes to courts. I endorse Weale’s argument for favouring a 
beneficial design approach over a rights approach to health care and to many 
other social goods.  Rights should not monopolise our moral and political 
thinking. 
 
Keywords: rights, human rights, neutrality, democracy, cultural difference, 
welfare 
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I am greatly honoured that a group of such distinguished scholars should have been 
willing to give their attention to my research.  I am also most grateful to Ian O’Flynn 
and Albert Weale for organising the conference at which these papers were first 
presented and for editing this special issue of CRISPP.  To receive the critical 
attention of so many famous names in British political philosophy is a rare luxury.  
This collection has a special value for me since the contributors have been friends and 
colleagues throughout my academic career and I have gained immeasurably from the 
intellectual life that I have shared with them over several decades.  Our thinking on 
our common concerns has sometimes converged and often differed, but all of the 
contributors have had a major impact on my own thinking and the debt I owe them 
extends far beyond this collection. 
 While the experience of having one’s work scrutinised by such an able body 
of scholars is both gratifying and flattering, it is also humbling and chastening.  I find 
myself called to account for unguarded comments and breezy generalisations that I 
managed to slip past editors and journal referees many years ago. I cannot make the 
usual excuse of youthful excess, since most of my indiscretions belong to middle-age 
and sometimes quite late middle-age.  That said, I am chastened only to a limited 
degree and in limited respects.  Perhaps unwisely, I remain stubbornly attached to 
most of the positions to which I committed my former self and the stubbornness with 
which I defend and reassert those positions will be more apparent in what follows 
than my readiness to learn from criticism.   The Socratic nature of analytical political 
philosophy pushes its practitioners towards disputation; too much agreement would 
threaten the subject’s survival.  But persuasion and progress in understanding are 
possible even in political philosophy and I have found much to learn from and to 
assent to in the papers that make up this collection.  I need hardly say that the brief 
responses I give to them in this Reply will not do justice to the subtle and detailed 
arguments they contain, particularly since those arguments often grow out of much 
larger bodies of work for which their authors have become well known and justly 
celebrated.   
 
Disagreement, discontinuity and rights 
 
In the 1980s Robert Goodin and Andrew Reeve invited me to write an essay on the 
neutral state for their volume, Liberal Neutrality (1989).  Writing that essay was 
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something of a Damascene experience and very much of what I have written since has 
had its origins in issues the essay made me confront.  Like many contemporary 
political theorists, I have been preoccupied with the diversity that characterises the 
populations of modern societies and with the question of how a population should 
provide for its own diversity.  More particularly, I have been concerned with the 
differences of belief, value and culture, because those differences present us not 
merely with ‘difference’ but with conflict.  In that context, it is easy to see the appeal 
of a neutralist strategy: if an arrangement providing for conflicting beliefs and values 
is to be acceptable to people, and if they are to accept it as fair, it cannot be one that 
simply privileges and imposes a belief or value that is part of the very conflict for 
which it aims to provide. It has to be an arrangement that is grounded independently 
of the beliefs and values at issue and which, in that sense, deals with the conflict 
neutrally.  It should regulate the conflict without becoming party to it. 
 Hillel Steiner has obviously felt the appeal of this approach every bit as 
strongly as I have.  His own defence of the case for a neutral or impartial strategy in 
the face of conflicting beliefs and values has been eloquent, both here and elsewhere.  
Steiner makes sparing use of the language of ‘neutrality’ and it is perhaps unfortunate 
that the strategy to which we both subscribe should have been characterised primarily 
in those terms, since it has occasioned much misplaced criticism.  For instance, critics 
have complained that it is impossible to be neutral about everything, but no neutralist 
has ever said otherwise.  In particular, neutralists are not neutral about the principles 
that inform or ground their neutralism; but it does not follow that there is no credible 
sense in which their approach is authentically neutral in the way it deals with the 
diversity for which it is designed.  The relevant strategy can be and has been 
characterised in other terms, particularly the distinction between the ‘right’ and the 
‘good’.  Like Steiner, my own preferred characterisation is the distinction between 
‘discontinuous’ and ‘continuous’ strategies for dealing with diversity, a distinction 
due to Ronald Dworkin (1990, pp. 16-22).  Neutralism belongs in the discontinuous 
stable, since it aims to establish a discontinuity between the diversity at stake and the 
principles that are used to regulate it.  A continuous strategy, by contrast, seeks a 
solution based on values that are somehow continuous with those that are in conflict 
and for which it has to provide. 
 There are many cases in which a continuous strategy is not feasible. Take the 
case of religious differences.  If a population tries to provide political arrangements 
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that deal fairly with differences in religious faith, an approach that searches for a 
solution in the very beliefs that are in conflict is decidedly unpromising.  Much more 
promising is an approach that requires the parties to step outside their religious 
bunkers and to see themselves not as adherents of this or that religion but as people 
who hold different and conflicting religious beliefs.  They should then think about 
what would be a fair arrangement amongst people so circumstanced.  Nowadays, the 
religious are likely to protest that their faiths are intrinsically tolerant and contain 
within themselves the solution to the diversity they present; in other words, there can 
be a continuity between different and conflicting faiths and the values that we call 
upon to provide for that difference.  However, viewed historically, it is hard to find 
that claim convincing.  If the political values of freedom and equality were written 
into Christianity and Islam all along, it is surprising that it took so long for their 
sponsors to discover them.  Much more plausible is the story that John Rawls tells – a 
story of faiths gradually adjusting and amending their doctrines to remove 
dissonances between their doctrine and changed moral and political thinking on 
liberty and equality.  The slow and reluctant way in which the Roman Catholic 
Church came to accept democracy and human rights is a perfect example of this 
process of gradual adjustment (Curran 1998).  It may be plausibly claimed, as Rawls 
does, that an overlapping consensus amongst religions on acceptable political 
arrangements now exists in many liberal societies, but that is not a consensus that was 
there all along.  Nor is it one formed around principles of liberty and equality and 
political practices and institutions that owe their origin only to religious doctrine.  
 My own thinking on these issues has been heavily influenced by Rawls even 
though, like many of his fellow travellers, I have sometimes bitten the hand that has 
fed me.  The strategy of discontinuity is not unique to Rawls, and it was a strategy he 
thought appropriate only to a society characterised by pluralism and a liberal 
democratic political culture (Rawls 1993, 1999).  Steiner’s commitment to the idea of, 
and need for, discontinuity is not similarly circumscribed nor, as far as I can see, is it 
similarly indebted to Rawls.  Unlike most of the major political theories that have 
been developed in recent decades, Steiner’s work, especially his Essay on Rights 
(1994), is distinguished by its lack of indebtedness to Rawls, even as an adversary.  
 How then does discontinuity relate to the purpose and content of rights?   For 
Steiner, it is disagreement and the need to provide for it discontinuously that explains 
both the purpose of rights and the moral priority they enjoy.  These also intimate what 
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it is that rights must be rights to: domains within which the right-holder alone is free 
to determine what shall be done.  By comparison with the simple austerity of Steiner’s 
view, my more varied conception of the purpose and content of rights will appear 
decidedly promiscuous.   However, I certainly agree with Steiner in giving 
disagreement and diversity a major role in determining the purpose and content of 
rights.  Rights have to make sense in, and have to provide for, a world in which 
people hold different beliefs, values and commitments.  Those rights include human 
rights and the differences they have to address include cultural differences.   
 David Miller detects a difference in emphasis between my approach in Rights 
(1994) and in articles on rights that I wrote thereafter, a difference, he suggests, that is 
to be explained by my having discovered ‘culture’.  I have indeed argued that, in 
conformity with the strategy of discontinuity, we might conceive human rights as 
standing in a second-order and regulative relation to cultural differences (Jones 2001).  
That argument does presuppose that cultural difference deserves to be taken seriously, 
but it does not entail that our response to cultures must be indiscriminate.  It also 
leaves human rights in a position of moral primacy.  I remain resistant to the way in 
which ‘culture’ is frequently deployed as a trump card in contemporary political 
argument and wary of attempts to sanctify practices and shield them from critical 
discussion by branding them ‘cultural’.  One reason for my taking up the issue of how 
human rights relate to cultural diversity was the common complaint (more common 
nowadays than in 1948) that the doctrine of human rights imposes a particular form of 
life – western and liberal – upon humanity at large.  Human rights advocates now find 
themselves caricatured as marauding imperialists callously trying to stop practices 
such as torture and tyrannously imposing freedom of thought and freedom of religion 
upon populations. For some western critics, it would seem that non-western 
populations, in embracing human rights, are merely running headlong to their chains.  
Protests about the alien influence of human rights and liberalism are rarely 
accompanied by similar protests against the influence of ideologies such as 
nationalism and Marxism, which are every bit as ‘western’ in origin and which often 
play a significant role in ‘non-western’ violations of human rights. 
 In fact, the generality of human rights, that now figure in a plethora of 
international declarations, covenants and conventions, do very little to impose a 
specific form of life on populations.  On the whole they establish a framework 
intended to give people the freedom and opportunity to live whatever form of life they 
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wish or believe to be right, including the most communal of communitarian forms of 
life.  In Miller’s own terms, they aim to secure the conditions for a minimally decent 
human life without specifying in any detail what particular life that should be.  Insofar 
as a diversity of beliefs, wishes and aspirations is part of the world for which human 
rights have to provide, those rights can, should and often do, take account of that 
diversity.  They do not, of course, sanction every kind of practice; they would be 
pointless if they did.  But, in the jargon of neutralism, they seek to lay down certain 
rules of right within which people are able and free to pursue different conceptions of 
the good. 
 In arguing that the theory of human rights needed to take cultural diversity 
seriously, I did not mean to suggest that that was the sole or main purpose of human 
rights.  As I have already indicated, my efforts to link the role of rights to the facts of 
pluralism and disagreement have been more modest and qualified than Steiner’s.  My 
view has been that the purpose that has done most to prompt the ideas of natural and 
human rights has been the protection of people from abuses of power, particularly 
political power.  Rights, such as rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
and rights not to suffer certain forms of discrimination, clearly do provide for 
differences, while rights not to be tortured, to be tried fairly, and not to suffer cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment, have a purpose that lies elsewhere.  But even those 
commonly-claimed human rights that relate less immediately to diversity, such as 
those I have just cited, along with rights relating to judicial processes, personal 
security and basic socio-economic goods, remain consistent with a multitude of 
different forms of life. 
 
Grounding human rights 
 
The diverse content of human rights has led me to think that the justification of 
human rights might also need to be diverse.  In proposing a pluralistic approach to the 
justification of human rights, I do not mean to suggest that all of the various extant 
justificatory theories of human rights could contribute to the task.  As Miller points 
out, that could not make sense since those theories are frequently incompatible.  
Rather my thought has been the more modest one that different rights may be rights 
for different reasons, and that the reasons that justify different rights can be different 
without being incompatible.  I mean to cast doubt on the assumption, widely shared 
 7 
amongst who take on the daunting task of justifying human rights, that all of these 
rights can stem, or should stem, from a single justificatory root. 
 Miller resists this doubt and remains committed to a unified justification of 
human rights.  He has long been a proponent of need as a normative notion that 
should contribute to our thinking on justice and he is joined by many others, including 
myself, in holding that need should contribute to our thinking on human rights.  
However, needs have been most frequently invoked in relation to socio-economic 
human rights; Miller is unusual in proposing that need can ground every sort of 
human right. 
 I remain sceptical about Miller’s bold claim in a number of ways, all of which 
concern the way in which he links need to the idea of a minimally decent human life 
(MDHL).  First, he does not claim that need alone can do the job; rather, it is need in 
conjunction with the notion of a MDHL.  That gives us reason to suspect that the 
primary normative work is being done by the notion of a MDHL rather than by the 
notion of need.  Once we have established, or have taken for granted, that everyone is 
entitled to a MDHL, we can go on to argue that everyone is also entitled to whatever 
he or she needs to live a MDHL.  (That is not quite true because, there may be 
elements of MDHL to which we do not think people have rights, e.g. love and 
friendship.)  But what gives moral force to claims of need and what gives content to 
those claims will be our notion of a MDHL.   
 Secondly, we may question whether the idea of MDHL provides a genuinely 
monistic justification of human rights.  T. M. Scanlon has argued that we should not 
think of well-being as a ‘master value’ (1998, pp.108-143); it is not ‘a good separate 
from other values, which are made valuable in turn by the degree to which they 
promote it’ (1998, p.142).  It is better understood as an ‘inclusive good’: one that 
encompasses the various particular goods that contribute to a life’s going well.  That 
would seem even more clearly true of a MDHL; that life is not a good in its own right 
from which all of the things that contribute to it derive their value.  It is a portmanteau 
term that we use to encompass all of the various things that make up a life’s being 
‘decent’.  If that is so, we can still think about human rights in terms of needs but the 
meeting of those needs will not promote a single unitary goal that we can label a 
MDHL.  Rather it will provide for the many and various constituents of a MDHL.  In 
other words, our ability to appeal to the idea of MDHL in justify human rights does 
not suffice to show that that justification will be genuinely monistic in character.  
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 Thirdly, in speaking of what is needed for a MDHL, there is a risk of 
conflating the instruments necessary for attaining a MDHL and the essential 
constituents of a MDHL.  Miller seems to stick consistently to an instrumental notion 
of need and I do not suggest therefore that he is guilty of this conflation when he 
argues that all human rights can be understood as catering for what is needed for a 
MDHL.  However, the claim that all human rights answer to needs is certainly more 
plausible if need is ambiguous between instruments and constituents.  For example, if 
we say that the right to a fair trial (which we may generalise as a right to be treated 
fairly by the judicial system to which one is subject) is needed for a MDHL, that is 
much more persuasive if we think of the possession of that right as itself part of – as 
itself a constituent of – a MDHL.  It is much less persuasive if we have to view the 
right to a fair trial as an instrument of – as something that provides a resource for – 
the attainment of a MDHL.  We can certainly tell a story about how the fairness of 
trials might serve other goods that matter to people, but that is not the whole story nor 
are we likely to regard it as the most important story we should tell if we were asked 
to defend the human right to a fair trial.  We are much more likely to think that being 
tried unfairly is, of itself, an injustice and, for that reason, the violation of a human 
right, irrespective of whatever other ills the victim suffers as a consequence of his 
unfair treatment. 
 It is, of course, much easier to pick holes in someone else’s justification of 
human rights than oneself to come up with an alternative that will do better.  Even if 
we do opt for a pluralistic approach, the task is still daunting.  But I want to pray in 
aid here an observation that I previously made on human rights and one to which 
Miller refers: the observation that ‘the traditional political purpose of natural or 
human rights has been to tell those who wield political power what they may and may 
not do’ (Jones 1994, p. 222).1  If that is true – and I still think it is – we should, in 
cataloguing human rights, be particularly aware of the respects in which people might 
be mistreated by political power and therefore of the different sorts of safeguard they 
will need.  If we approach the compilation of a catalogue of human rights with that 
purpose in mind, it will be unsurprising if the human rights we end up with are a 
rather heterogeneous set – such as, for example, the rights to security of person, 
freedom of religion, social security, a nationality, and a fair trial (all of which appear 
in the UDHR 1948).  We might speak of all of these rights as rights that people ‘need’ 
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to secure them from the abuse of power, but that does not indicate that need 
contributes significantly to the reasons for these rights being rights. 
 I do, however, want to add a comment on that approach.  While I think 
providing safeguards and guarantees in relation to political power has been the 
principal driving concern behind the natural and human rights tradition, I do not mean 
that to be definitive of human rights.  Some authors have defined human rights as 
rights only against governments (e.g. Martin 1993).  By contrast, I would see taming 
political power as one of the major – and as historically perhaps the major – practical 
implication of ascribing rights to human beings as human beings.  But the idea of 
human rights is not, and should not be, limited to that domain.  If, for example, an 
individual is abused by a commercial organisation in the same way as he might have 
been abused by a government, and if that abuse by a government would have been the 
violation of a human right, I see no good reason for denying that the commercial 
organisation violates a human right.  Similarly, if the idea of human rights brings with 
it an idea of the fundamentally equal moral status amongst human beings, I see no 
reason why human rights might not be invoked when we condemn the unequal 
treatment of women.  So, although I think that human rights have been conceived 
primarily in relation to governments and although the provision of safeguards against 
political power can help to make sense of the heterogeneity of human rights, I do not 
suggest that the very idea of a human right should be confused with that purpose. 
 
Neutrality, the right and the good 
 
If my thinking about rights has been more modestly ‘discontinuous’ than Steiner’s 
and if it has verged on being too discontinuous to satisfy Miller, its having aspired to 
discontinuity in any measure has been enough to earn the scepticism of John Horton.   
He is sceptical of the entire family of neutralist or impartialist forms of liberalism, and 
their efforts to distinguish the right from the good.  He takes me to task for 
commenting that ‘the real test of a liberal is whether one believes that it is permissible 
for the state to subsidise opera’.  While I cannot now recall saying that, I do not doubt 
that I did.  I hope I said it ironically and with a smile on my face, but I cannot be sure 
that I was not in earnest.
2
 Certainly if we do adopt a distinction between the right and 
the good and require political power to concern itself with nothing but the right, we 
would seem to remove state patronage of the arts and much else besides from the 
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political agenda.  Some liberals have tried to make a case for state funding of the arts 
that avoids any claim that they are of intrinsic worth but, like Horton, I find their 
efforts desperate and unconvincing.  In truth, I do not want to embargo the state’s 
supporting opera, or other art forms, or museums and libraries.  As Horton 
acknowledges, there is a legitimate argument to be had about state subsidies for opera 
and the case for those subsidies has to be made.  He rightly mocks the idea that 
anyone is ‘disrespected’ if their state supports opera, but the more pertinent Rawlsian 
question is whether that support is fair.  Is it fair that public funds should be used to 
support a form of entertainment that is enjoyed by only a minority of taxpayers, most 
of whom come from the better-off section of society, particularly if there is no 
counterbalancing use of taxpayers’ money to support other, more ‘popular’, forms of 
entertainment?  The fact that the sum of money involved is paltry compared with 
other government expenditure does not dispose of the issue of principle.  If a 
satisfactory justification is to be found, it cannot be one that claims that some people – 
those with a taste for opera – should count for more than others.  It must be more 
impersonal in form: opera has an intrinsic worth that merits public support. On that 
point, as on so much else, I agree with Brian Barry (2001, pp. 198-9).  State subsidy 
of opera is likely to escape the charge of unfairness only if it is conceived as not a 
matter of fairness at all.  
 However, while I am willing to run up the white flag in the case of opera, I am 
not similarly willing to renounce my use of the distinction between the right and the 
good in other contexts.  Apart from the case of opera, Horton focuses his critique of 
that distinction mainly upon my use of it in relation to cultural diversity.  I was aware 
that applying the distinction to cultural differences was particularly provocative, since 
a culture is often thought to be something that we cannot get ‘outside’ and view 
impartiality.  Even so, it is commonplace for people to insist that in a multicultural 
society, cultural differences should be provided for justly or fairly or equally.  That, in 
turn, implies that a society should, in its public life, be impartial in its treatment of the 
cultural differences present in its population.
3
  It is not unusual to hear people insist 
that this sort of impartiality is impossible, but then go on to complain bitterly about 
partiality or bias a society displays in its treatment of different cultures.  I do not 
claim that it is practically possible or even desirable for a society to be impartial with 
respect to everything that the sprawling term ‘culture’ might encompass. Language is 
often cited as an example of something on which it is neither practicable not desirable 
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that a society should be neutral, although some societies, like Belgium and Canada, do 
endeavour to be even-handed between two languages.  But if we accept that a society 
cannot be, or should not be, impartial about everything, it does not follow that it 
cannot be, or should not be, impartial about anything.  The shift in perspective that I 
cited earlier in relation to religious difference can also be made in relation to cultural 
difference.  That is we, as the members of a multicultural society, rather than seeing 
the world and making demands only from the blinkered perspective of our own 
culture, can shift to a perspective in which we see ourselves and our fellow citizens as 
possessors of different cultural inheritances and commitments.  We can also 
appreciate that other’s inheritances and commitments matter to them as ours do to us. 
We can then begin to think about what constitutes a fair arrangement amongst citizens 
who possess different cultural allegiances. 
 This shift in perspective is sometimes said to be impossible and to require 
people to be schizophrenic. But that is melodramatic nonsense. It is a shift that we 
very commonly make.  That is, rather than living in a solipsistic bubble in which we 
are sensitive to nothing but our own preferences and commitments, we are normally 
aware that others have preferences and commitments that differ from our own.  There 
is nothing unusual or far-fetched in our then seeing ourselves as one person amongst 
many, each of whom is of equal status, and going on to think about what would be the 
right or the fair arrangement when we see the world in that way.  That, for instance, 
was the perspective adopted by Rowan Williams as Archbishop of Canterbury when 
he called for the protection afforded to Christianity by the English common law of 
blasphemy to be extended to Islam and other non-Christian faiths. 
 That shift in perspective alone is not guaranteed to deliver unanimity on what 
constitutes the fair treatment of differences.  The distinction between the right and the 
good sometimes goes along with the claim that those who possess different and 
conflicting conceptions of the good can nevertheless agree upon the principles of right 
that should regulate their pursuit of those conceptions.  That claim is sometimes 
justified.  For instance, in most liberal democratic societies there is a broad consensus 
upon the principle of freedom of religion and one that includes those who possess 
different religious beliefs.  There are sometimes, of course, disputes about how 
precisely that principle should be translated into public policy, but those disputes arise 
within a consensus on the general principle of freedom of religion.  However, I do not 
claim that issues of right will always be free of controversy, but, even if they are not, 
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that is no reason to rubbish the distinction between the right and the good, since the 
distinction marks a difference of kind between issues.  Argument about the correct or 
best conception of the good and argument about the right principles for regulating 
relations amongst people who have different and conflicting conceptions of the good, 
are arguments about different sorts of issue.  Plato notwithstanding, I cannot see why 
all of our moral thinking should be reducible, without loss, to an undifferentiated 
moral blob that we label ‘the good’. 
 The case of cultural difference is particularly challenging because of the all-
enveloping content that we commonly give that concept, but the shift in perspective I 
describe would still be possible and significant if, as Horton alleges, cultures penetrate 
the right.  We can still distinguish between the role and status of principles conceived 
merely as the principles of a particular culture from principles designed to provide 
fairly for differences amongst cultures.  There is one respect in which I still want to 
resist the sort of ultimacy that Horton claims for ‘culture’.  My argument has been that 
insofar as cultures matter, they matter primarily if and because they matter to those 
who bear them.  Thus, our ultimate concern should be not for cultures but for those 
whose cultures they are.  I still think it no less bizarre to ascribe moral standing to a 
culture qua culture than to a painting or a musical composition or a language (Jones 
1998, p. 36).  If I am correct about that, the issue at the level of the right should be 
about which people should count and about what follows from their counting; it will 
not be about which culture qua culture we should knuckle under.  Nor, if cultures 
incorporate principles of the right, can we burke this issue by leaving it to be 
determined by each culture since, logically, the issue of moral standing, and who 
possesses it, must precede claims of culture. 
 Horton expresses some surprise that I allow that impartial arrangements need 
not be liberal arrangements.  If we believe that the ultimate units of standing should 
be individuals, it is still open to people to argue that some individuals should count for 
more than others.  While I, of course, sympathise with Steiner’s claim that human 
individuals should enjoy an equality of status, I am less sanguine than he is of the ease 
with which its triumph will be secured, although we can reasonably place the onus of 
justification upon those who wish to depart from equality.  Groups rather than 
individuals might also be proposed as the relevant units of standing.  Another option 
is resort to a procedural rather than a substantive form of impartiality.  For example, a 
society might deal with cultural difference by way of democracy and majority rule, so 
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that the culture that shapes a society’s public life is whatever culture a majority of its 
members votes for.  We may regard the outcome of that procedure as substantively 
unfair, but a procedure can be fair qua procedure even though it yields an unfair 
outcome.  A commitment to democracy together with majority rule can count as an 
authentic commitment to impartiality, provided that it is a principled commitment to 
the fairness of the procedure and not a commitment contingent upon a particular 
outcome.  A group cannot claim to be authentically committed to procedural 
impartiality if it demands equal rights when it is in the minority and unequal rights 
when it is in the majority.  Most of the critical comment upon neutralism or 
impartiality has focused upon whether it is possible.  The burden of my argument here 
and elsewhere is that more of it should be about whether neutrality or impartiality is 
justified and, if so, what form it should take, and how extensive its range should be. 
 While Horton is generally sceptical of the whole neutralist approach, and 
particularly of the distinction between the right and the good, much of his argument is 
directed not at the discontinuous strategy as such but at its ‘misguidedly rigorist’ 
forms.  I have no wish to defend ‘rigorism’.  Being committed to a principle does not 
mean that we have to be fanatical and unyielding in our commitment and bone-
headedly oblivious to other considerations.  Nor does it compel us to ignore the fact 
that we start not with a blank sheet but with a particular society and a particular 
historical legacy.  Horton cites the case of the established Church of England as an 
example of non-neutral arrangement that does not evoke complaints of unfairness and 
unequal respect from other Christian denominations or other faiths.  Like Brian Barry 
(again), I am phlegmatic about the established status of the Church of England (Barry 
1995, p. 165).  The reality in Britain is that neither other variants of Christianity, nor 
non-Christian faiths, nor even secularism, are significantly disadvantaged by church 
establishment in its contemporary form.  Horton rightly notices that the adherents of 
other faiths now sometimes given their blessing to the established church, but that is 
because they have come to regard secularism, rather than one another, as their 
principal enemy.  In their eyes, disestablishment would be a victory for secularism 
rather than a blow for religious equality.  However, in the different world of 
nineteenth century Britain, when Anglicanism really was privileged, dissenting 
Protestants objected very strongly to establishment and sought its abolition.  
Moreover, if we really could scrape the canvas clean and start afresh, it is hard to 
imagine anyone, including Anglicans, pressing the case for an established church. 
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Rights and democracy 
 
Horton’s opposition to distinguishing the right from the good is matched by Richard 
Bellamy’s opposition to separating rights from democracy.  Both see giving a distinct 
and privileged status to rights and ‘the right’ as part of a misguided attempt to take 
them ‘out of politics’.  Bellamy challenges any suggestion, including my own, that 
rights might properly function as constraints upon democratic politics. 
 We might distinguish between two categories of right: those that we conceive 
as ‘human’ or ‘fundamental’ rights and those of a more quotidian and prosaic sort.  
We generally give the former, but not the latter, a special political status and one 
reason for that, I have argued, is because we believe they should serve as checks on 
political power.  I take it that, while Bellamy may be concerned with both sorts of 
right, he also has particularly in mind rights of the former sort – rights of particular 
moment, such as the right to be tried fairly or the right not to be tortured.  However, 
he argues that it is a mistake to conceive these rights as checks upon political power, 
or at least as checks upon democratic power.  Rather than pit rights against 
democracy, we should think of rights as the offspring of democracy.  We should place 
rights ‘inside’ rather than ‘outside’ democratic politics.  Bellamy accepts another 
distinction that I make: that between ‘democratic rights’ (rights that are intrinsic to the 
democratic process, such as the rights to vote and to freedom of expression) and ‘non-
democratic rights’ (rights that are concerned with something other than the 
democratic process, such as rights to freedom of religion, to be tried fairly, and not to 
be subjected to torture).  But he argues that rights of both sorts are properly grounded 
in democracy and, in that respect, both might be described as ‘democratic rights’.   
 Bellamy’s argument relates (i) to the way we should think of the rights that 
people have and (ii) to the institutions that we should employ to uphold and safeguard 
those rights.  For Bellamy, these two issues are closely related but here I want to 
address them separately.  How then should we think of having rights?  In virtue of 
what can people claim rights?  Bellamy’s answer is: as the citizens of a democratic 
society.  But how exactly are those citizens’ rights grounded in democracy? 
 Parts of Bellamy’s argument suggest a simple answer.  In a democratic 
society, the demos possesses ultimate political authority on all matters, so that the 
members of that society will have all and only those rights that the demos decides 
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they should have.  We might describe this as the Hobbesian conception of democracy 
since it conceives the demos as ‘sovereign’ (in Hobbes’s sense): for political 
purposes, the demos is the ultimate authority on all matters of right.  One thing that 
suggests this understanding of Bellamy’s argument is the stress he places on the 
extent and depth of disagreement that surrounds rights. The more we stress the 
inevitability and the inescapability of that disagreement, the more we are pushed 
towards a Hobbesian way of dealing with it.  If this is how we should conceive the 
relationship between democracy and rights, we can do little more than sit back and let 
democracy takes its course: we will know what rights people have only once the 
democratic process has declared what rights they shall have.  We may be able to 
anticipate what some of those rights will be, but they will actually be rights only if 
and when they receive the stamp of democratic authority. 
 Something that reinforces this understanding of Bellamy’s position is his 
insistence that the democracy in which he grounds rights is not an idealised decision-
procedure, analogous to those employed by Habermas and Rawls.  Rather he means to 
ground rights in, and to derive them from, real-world democratic processes (pp. x, xx-
xx).  Yet, in spite of his protests to the contrary, there does seem to be an element of 
idealising in Bellamy’s argument.  He commends us to think about rights in a 
‘democratic spirit’ (pp. x, xx) and to use ‘democratic forms of reasoning’ (p. xx).  All 
rights, he says, ‘involve a democratic form of justification – they imply a spirit of 
political equality to be accorded equal concern and respect’ (p. x).  Political equality 
is, of course, fundamental to a democratic political system, but Bellamy seems to 
contemplate its being carried forward and instantiated in the decisions that the demos 
goes on to make.  He makes clear that the democracy he contemplates is majoritarian 
democracy (p. x), but he entertains none of the traditional fears for the fate of 
minorities. His lack of concern seems to derive from an assumption that his 
democratic citizens will always be good egalitarian citizens, who will treat people 
equally in the decisions they make as well as in the way they make them, and who 
will always pursue a good that is authentically public (p. xx). 
 We may suspect that it is the principle of equal concern and respect, rather 
than democracy itself, that really drives Bellamy’s argument.  That principle would 
seem to justify both democratic decision-making and a set of rights.  So, we might 
object, it is not democracy that grounds rights; rather the principle that justifies 
democracy also justifies rights, and it justifies rights not ‘through’, but independently 
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of, democracy, so that those rights stand alongside democracy as its moral equals 
rather than its moral subordinates.  However, Bellamy fends off that objection by 
arguing that we respect people equally only ‘if their views have been equally 
considered’ and we show them equal concern only ‘through collective arrangements 
that can be shown to track their common recognisable interests’ (p. x; also p. x).  In 
other words, equal concern and respect requires us to arrive at rights through a 
democratic process; if we take any other route to rights, we shall violate the principle 
of equal concern and respect and perhaps also the ideal ‘non-domination’. 
 But, as I have already indicated, Bellamy’s argument seems to suppose that 
the principle of equal concern and respect will shape not only political institutions and 
procedures but also the thoughts of democratic citizens as they enter the decision-
making arena.  Only if that is so, can we expect them to arrive at the rights that 
everyone ought to enjoy.  If they fail to keep faith with that principle, they will fail to 
deliver the rights they should.  It is in that respect that Bellamy’s argument on rights 
strikes me as an exercise in ideal theory.  It is an argument that contemplates the 
rights that people would settle on if they were deciding under genuinely democratic 
circumstances and with full respect for democratic principles.  
 There is another respect in which Bellamy’s argument seems to belong to ideal 
theory.  If rights are grounded in democracy and must be delivered by democracy, 
what are we to say of people who have the misfortune to live under undemocratic 
forms of government or in flawed democracies? Do they not have rights too?  
Bellamy recognises this issue and sees the solution as the incorporation of the 
excluded into the democratic community where they will enjoy rights on equal terms 
with others (p.xx).  But that does not tell us what rights people possess while they 
remain subject to the non-ideal circumstances of undemocratic government.  These 
are precisely the circumstances in which we want to appeal to human rights – rights 
that people have in virtue of being human and that are violated by show-trials, 
genocidal campaigns, religious persecution, and the like.  Any understanding of 
fundamental rights that precludes our saying that the Nazis or the Khmer Rouge 
violated rights is seriously hobbled and will not come anywhere close to playing the 
role that the conception of human rights has traditionally played. 
 My own approach to basic rights has been to ask what rights we have reason 
to attribute to people either as human beings or as citizens.  The reasons will be moral 
reasons, but moral reasons informed by a knowledge of human beings and of human 
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circumstances, including the realities of the political world and of political power.  I 
think of those rights as moral rights, but as moral rights that have political 
implications; that is the only respect in which I will own up to thinking of rights as 
‘prior to politics’.  I accept that a good argument is not enough to justify the 
imposition of a rights regime upon a population.  Some sort of process of acceptance, 
either national or global, will be necessary to legitimate the regime, but legitimating 
the regime is not the same as, nor can it be a substitute for, working out what its 
content should be.  In particular, when people enter the democratic arena, their 
acceptance that their decision should be made democratically will not tell them what 
their decision ought to be.  They will necessarily invoke moral principles and 
considerations other than democracy, along with their knowledge of human 
circumstances and their beliefs about human interests.  When moral and political 
philosophers argue about human rights, that is the sort of exercise in which I 
understand them to be engaged.  Bellamy’s claim seems to be not merely that a 
regime of rights must be endorsed by the population whose lives it will regulate, but 
also that the very idea of democracy and the very existence of a democratic process 
will somehow suffice to tell citizens what rights there ought to be.  I cannot find that 
claim plausible, assuming that Bellamy expects democracy to deliver rights that will 
be similar in scope and substance to those enumerated in the UN’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and not a severely attenuated set of rights 
relating only to political procedures. 
 When we shift from the question of what rights there should be to the issue of 
who should look after them, I can rival Bellamy in my reservations about 
constitutional entrenchment and judicial review.  For example, I believe it little short 
of a scandal that a document, worded so generally and vaguely as the European 
Convention on Human Rights, should be administered by courts in the same way that 
they administer ordinary Parliamentary legislation.  I do not blame the courts for this 
state of affairs.  Judges are simply performing a task that the politicians have assigned 
them, and politicians’ complaints about judicial decisions on, for example, privacy 
law often ring hollow because those same politicians are reluctant to grasp the nettle 
themselves and give courts clearer direction.  My ideal state of affairs would be one in 
which the idea of human rights is heavily ingrained in a society’s political culture, but 
one in which the conflicts of value and competing considerations that will inevitably 
arise in implementing rights are dealt with by democratic politicians in a good faith 
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manner rather than by judges.  As Bellamy quotes my saying, ‘rights should be 
special, but their specialness should be felt in the way they are handled by politicians 
rather than in their not being handled by politicians’ (Jones 1994, p. 225).  So I have 
some sympathy with Bellamy’s stance on these issues.  However, his stance does 
raise questions relating to his own ideal of non-domination. 
 For the republican (e.g. Pettit 1997), there is critical difference between not 
being interfered with and not being liable to interference.  Even if I am liable to 
interference by another, I may not actually be interfered with and to that extent I may 
remain free.  But my freedom will fall short of non-domination because I remain prey 
to the arbitrary interference of another.  For republicans, freedom is a condition rather 
than a non-event; it consists in not being liable to interference by others.  Now 
consider the conception of democracy that Bellamy offers us.  That will be a 
democracy whose authority is in no way fettered by rights.  But the existence of that 
comprehensive and unconstrained authority must mean that each individual citizen 
remains comprehensively at the mercy of the democratic sovereign and is therefore 
‘dominated’ by it.  Each citizen will of course have an equal vote with others in the 
exercise of that sovereignty, but for one individual amongst a demos numbered in 
millions that may offer little comfort.  How could citizens become less dominated?  
The obvious answer is by acquiring constitutionally entrenched rights that limit the 
scope of democratic authority and that correspondingly enhance the non-dominance 
that each citizen enjoys.  Each entrenched right would constitute an ‘immunity’, in 
relation to which others, including democratic governments, would possess a 
corresponding Hohfeldian ‘disability’ or ‘no-power’. Each immunity would therefore 
be a zone of non-dominance.  It would seem then that, contrary to the general thrust of 
Bellamy’s argument, pursuit of non-dominance should lead us in the direction of 
constitutionally entrenched rights US-style.   
 Bellamy seeks to resist that implication by talking up the potentially arbitrary, 
biased, elitist, controversial, and politically motivated nature of judicial decisions that 
rule on rights. But, while I share some of his worries about judicial discretion, being 
subject to the reasoning of a judge may still seem less arbitrary than being subject to 
the will of a legislature.  Bellamy also seeks to fend off worries about unfettered 
democracy by stressing that democracy secures non-domination through its 
procedural features, rather than through the substance of its decisions.  Perhaps that 
should lead us to voice a different worry: are the demands of non-domination being 
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scaled back to secure a harmony between procedural democracy in general and its real 
world versions in particular? 
4
 
 Bellamy associates my approach to rights with liberalism and with freedom 
conceived as non-interference, as distinct from the republican conception of non-
domination.  That is not an association, or dissociation, I recognise.  Rights work 
differently from freedom.  Republicans distinguish (what they reckon to be) the 
liberal conception of freedom as non-interference from their own conception of 
freedom as non-domination. However, it is hard to see how there might be two 
conceptions of rights that mimic those two conceptions of freedom.  The idea of a 
right that one has only insofar as it remains uninfringed makes little sense.  If we 
think merely in terms of liberty-rights (what Hohfeld called ‘privileges’ and other 
sometimes call ‘liberties’ – the absence of obligations to the contrary), we could 
perhaps say that people have those rights insofar as they find themselves without 
obligations to the contrary and even though they may be liable to obligations to the 
contrary (e.g. by the creation of new obligations through legislation).  But to present 
that as the ‘liberal’ conception of rights would be a travesty (and no less of a travesty 
just because Hobbes – a favourite ‘liberal’ of the republicans – understood natural 
rights as liberty-rights).  For liberals, as for others, significant rights, such as human 
rights or the rights of citizens, are claim-rights or immunities or both.  Claim-rights 
impose duties upon others and immunities impose ‘disabilities’ or ‘no powers’ upon 
others.  Both sorts of right are instruments of non-domination. Slavery is the most 
complete form of domination just because it is a rightless condition.  Certainly some – 
but equally certainly not all – of the rights that theorists like myself champion are 
rights to non-interference, but to have a right to non-interference is quite different 
from merely being uninterfered with.  According people rights creates precisely the 
sort of condition that non-domination demands. 
 
Rights and collective goods 
 
Although Bellamy’s argument may contain hints of scepticism about rights-talk, he is 
not hostile to rights as such.  For Bellamy, rights can properly figure in a political 
arrangement provided they do so as the instruments or offspring of democracy rather 
its rivals.  But the extent to which rights now figure in people’s political vocabularies 
does often attract scepticism.  Even someone who is broadly sympathetic to a rights-
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approach has reason to acknowledge that it is not the most defensible or appropriate 
approach for every issue a society confronts.  Health care is now frequently talked 
about in the language of rights, but Albert Weale gives us reason to doubt whether 
health care policy is best conceived in those terms and I can only assent to his 
measured scepticism. 
 Weale’s scepticism is directed not, of course, at the desirability or goodness of 
health care. Health would seem to be amongst the least controversial of human goods 
and, even allowing for asceticism, it scores well as a cross-cultural good.  Rather his 
scepticism concerns the utility and appropriateness of a rights-approach to health care.  
As he points out, the right to health care is now well entrenched in human rights 
documents and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1966) sets the bar high in asserting that everyone has the right to ‘the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health’ (article 12).  Weale’s assessment of 
this right focuses more upon health care as a human right than as a human right, but 
both claims are controversial. 
 It seems clear that, in 1948, the drafters of the UDHR did not conceive the 
socio-economic rights included in the Declaration as genuinely human rights.  Rather 
they conceived them as rights of citizens, that is, as rights that each government or 
each society should secure for its citizens.  The fact that the rights were formulated 
not as rights to general resources or to a given standard of material well-being but as 
rights to specific goods and services indicates that they would be primarily rights 
possessed by individuals as members of states.  Indeed, they were clearly rights 
inspired the welfare states that had developed in many industrialised societies. The 
UDHR described itself as setting ‘a common standard of achievement for all peoples 
and all nations’ and, in line with that self-characterisation, the Declaration was partly 
an exercise in target-setting for governments.  Now it could be that states, or their 
governments, were thought of as mere intermediaries that humanity was using to 
deliver genuinely universal rights, but I have never been persuaded by that claim.  If 
the goods and services secured to each individual were to be geared to the resources 
available to each state – and article 22 of the UDHR came clean in stating that the 
right to social security was to be ‘in accordance with the organization and resources of 
each state’ – the socio-economic goods to which the members of poor states were 
entitled were markedly different and inferior to those claimable by individuals in rich 
societies.  How, then, could these be authentically human rights: rights possessed 
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identically and equally by all human beings as human beings?  The human right to 
health care illustrates that objection particularly well.  No amount of pleading about 
the relevance of local circumstances can show that the rights to health care that 
contemporary India or Mali might extend to its citizens can equate in value with those 
that can be enjoyed in contemporary Switzerland or Sweden. 
 That is not to say that a human right to health care is intrinsically nonsensical.  
On the contrary, securing an equivalent level of health care amongst the world’s 
population is both intelligible and, for the most part and in principle, possible.  My 
point is simply that, if we assert a ‘human right’ to health care, we should mean what 
we say and conceive the right as a global right with its attendant global obligations 
and global claims upon resources.  Nowadays, a greater number of people than half a 
century ago are willing to think about socio-economic goods in a genuinely 
cosmopolitan way, but, beyond the relief of poverty, their views are still not widely 
shared by either politicians or ordinary citizens.   
 If we set aside the issue of whether health should be conceived as a genuinely 
human right, we are still left with Weale’s question: do rights (of any kind) provide us 
with the appropriate normative apparatus for thinking about goods such as health 
care?  A common complaint is that assertions of rights to socio-economic goods, such 
as health care, provide us with no clue about the specific quantity and quality of the 
good to which there is a right. The ICESCR may appear to be an exception in 
asserting a right to the ‘highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ 
(article 12) but, as Weale ably demonstrates, that standard is simply question-begging.  
However, Weale’s doubts about the serviceability of a general right to health care go 
beyond the common complaint that it fails to answer the question: a right to how 
much?  Rather he argues that we have reason to think about goods such as health care 
in terms other than rights. 
 He contrasts the rights approach with the beneficial design approach. In some 
measure, resource issues remain important to the differences between those 
approaches.  If we move from the idea of a universal right to a basic level of health 
care to the goal of ‘comprehensive, high quality care available to all those eligible for 
its services without financial barriers to access’ (p. x), the greater ambition of that 
goal will mean that the claims of health care will compete more fiercely for resources 
with the claims of other social goods.  Moreover, as Weale explains, we shall also be 
faced with severe choices between competing claims within the category of health 
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care.  Invoking rights is singularly unhelpful in dealing with those competing claims 
to resources.   
 However, the contrast Weale draws is not merely a contrast between the 
relative utility of two different approaches for resolving issues of scarce resources.  It 
is a contrast between two fundamentally different normative approaches to the 
provision of health care.  A rights-based approach will begin with the question, what 
is the health care to which each individual has a right? And it will go on to ask, what 
are the obligations imposed by that right and upon whom does it impose those 
obligations?  Ultimately, if not immediately, those who bear the obligations are likely 
to encompass most of those who hold the right; even so, a rights-approach will still 
give primacy to the demands people can make upon each other.  By contrast, the 
beneficial design approach starts with the question: how should we provide for our 
health care?  It asks not what can each of us demand of the rest, but what should we 
do together?  It treats the provision of health care as a collective endeavour: what 
sorts of health care arrangement should we put in place to provide for our mutual 
good?  That perspective seems more consonant with the approach to health policy in 
societies like Britain and also more consonant with a health policy that aims to do 
more than secure a basic minimum for all.  It is also more consistent with the area of 
discretion we generally suppose each society has in deciding how it should deploy its 
public resources.  As Weale points out, while the beneficial design approach does not 
start from individual rights, it can issue in rights – rights that give citizens equal 
access to the health care for which their society has made collective provision.  For 
those who aspire to make rights justiciable, the only right to health that has any 
chance of being assessable by a court is one that has emerged from a series of 
complex and detailed policy decisions and that is nested within a given set of policy 
parameters.  If the right to health care is supposed to lie at the foundation of health 
policy, judges are clearly not the right people to decide what it demands.   
 We might tell similar stories about how Weale’s two approaches relate to 
goods such as education, housing, and personal security.  In their case too, we are 
likely to conclude that the assertion of rights is of little help in deciding what sort of 
provision we should make, and of doubtful merit in determining the moral spirit in 
which we make that provision.  So do we have any reason to go on characterising 
health care and its like as fundamental rights?  One purpose that claims of right, 
especially claims of human right, have served has been to identify goods that we 
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should prioritise because of their special value for human beings.  That purpose has 
been an important driver behind the addition of socio-economic rights to the 
traditional catalogues of civil and political rights.  If we do not add rights to health 
care or to adequate food, clothing and shelter to the list of human rights, we may 
appear to be saying that those goods matter less than freedom of expression, freedom 
of religion and the other standard fare of traditional declarations. In most people’s 
lives, the opposite is likely to be true.  Indeed, if we apply Miller’s test of what is 
needed for a minimally decent life, health care, along with many other socio-
economic goods, scores well and does so for reasons that are much more simple and 
straightforward than those that argue for freedom of expression or freedom of 
religion.  In so far as we want to go on using the idea of rights to assure a basic 
minimum to all, either as citizens or as human beings, so that there will be ‘bread for 
all before jam for some’, we have reason to go on speaking of health care in the 
language of rights.  But, when we turn to the actual provision of goods such as health 
care, we can have reason to aspire to more than the notional minima those rights 
demand, and reason, as Weale shows, not to expect rights to contribute helpfully to 
resolving the policy issues we shall encounter.  Rights should have an important place 
in our moral and political thinking, but they should not monopolise either sort of 
thinking. 
The ease with which people can and do assert rights and the consequent 
proliferation of rights-claims has become a major preoccupation of commentators on 
rights.  For some, it has helped foster a hostility to claims of moral and human rights 
reminiscent of Jeremy Bentham (e.g. Geuss 2001).  For others, it has helped make the 
case for limiting ‘rights’ to conventional rights, principally legal rights. For these 
conventionalists, a ‘moral right’ should be understood as a morally justified 
conventional right; in the absence of a conventional right, there simply is no right that 
can be either moral or immoral (e.g. Darby 2009; Martin 1993).  In a similar spirit, 
many now argue that expansive moral thought on the rights that we might ascribe to 
human beings should give way to a focus on the political function that human rights 
actually perform in the contemporary world.  The idea of human rights should be 
shaped by its practical role in justifying international intervention and by the real-
world practice of human rights that has developed since 1948 (e.g. Beitz 2009; Rawls 
1999; Raz 2010).  While there is much to commend these efforts to contain rights 
thinking within some sort of limit, there is also a danger that they will exclude too 
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much.  The idea of moral rights as morally grounded entitlements provides a 
distinctive and significant element of our moral thinking and, arguably, we have to 
think of human rights as moral rights first and foremost if they are to perform their 
traditional role of curbing and containing the use of political power (Jones 
forthcoming).  But those of us who want to keep faith with the orthodox conceptions 
of moral and human rights still face a major challenge in setting non-arbitrary 
boundaries to rights that prevent the orthodoxy collapsing into an anarchy of rights-
claims that devalues and discredits the very idea of rights. 
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Notes 
 
1. This would have been better expressed as telling those who wield political power 
‘what they may not do to, and what they must do for, those over whom they wield 
their power’.  That formulation would have better captured the point that human rights 
can impose positive as well as negative obligations on power-holders. 
 
2. I suspect the comment had its origins in arguments I had with Simon Caney over 
many years on the relative merits of neutralist and perfectionist liberalism.  I would 
always start from the case of religion, while he would always start from the cases of 
opera and the non-medical use of drugs. 
 
3. I previously assumed too readily that the impartial treatment demanded by fairness 
must be equal or equivalent treatment.  But, even if we hold, for example, that 
fairness is consistent with greater weight being given to the culture of the indigenous 
or majority population by comparison with the cultures of migrant groups, that 
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judgement still implies the sort of external or supra-cultural perspective that I go on to 
describe.  Insofar as this view involves a commitment to a general principle that, for 
some public purposes, an indigenous culture should weigh more than migrant 
cultures, that principle remains impartial with respect to any particular culture qua 
particular culture.  If, on the other hand, an imbalance in the weight given to the 
indigenous culture and migrant cultures reflects no more than an imbalance in the 
power of indigenous and migrant groups, there will be nothing ‘impartial’ about it. 
 
4. This is an issue to which Bellamy has given a great deal of attention, both 
normative and empirical (Bellamy 2007).  The few doubts I express here do not even 
begin to address the extensive and closely argued case he makes.  
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